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Introduction1
The purpose of this study is to analyse if social development – broadly defined
– has an effect on the level of investment in developing countries. In the
general development debate, economic development as measured by growth in
GDP per capita is viewed as an important, but not sufficient, means of
achieving improvements in human well-being, reduction in absolute poverty,
wider choices and greater opportunities to realise human capabilities, and
other development goals. There is also broad agreement that a higher level of
investment in a country is conducive to a higher rate of economic growth
(other things being equal), though the exact relationship depends on a number
of institutional and other factors. A standard development argument therefore
runs as follows: Higher investment enables higher economic growth, which in
turn may enable the realisation of social development and other development
objectives.
However, some studies suggest that the reverse causality may be at work:
Important development goals such as broad participation, equitable
distribution, open societies with extensive freedoms and accountable
governments, may contribute to a higher level of savings and investment, and
higher economic growth. The purpose of this report is to study one such
potential relationship; whether elements of what is termed social development
are positively related to the level of economic investment in developing
countries. Previous attempts at providing empirical evidence for the idea that
social development promotes economic growth have met with mixed success.
In the quite extensive empirical literature on economic growth, variables
reflecting social development only occasionally prove significant and robust
determinants of growth, as reflected in the literature reviews of Sala-i-Martin
(1997), Durlauf and Quah (1999), Temple (1999), and Florax et al (2001). As
this report shows, many elements of social development appear to have little
or no impact on investment, and some may even have a negative impact,
whereas other elements are positively related to investment activity.
The focus of this study is on empirical studies, and in particular on evidence
from developing countries in recent years, mostly the 1990s, though
comparative experience from earlier periods and from industrialised countries
is also of relevance. One could argue that many of the issues discussed are best
studied over medium or longer time periods, and that for instance taking a
long term perspective on industrialised and semi-industrialised countries –
such as Scandinavian development over the last 150 years – would provide
some illuminating points. However, as the nature of investment changes over
time, in terms of sector composition and other factors, the empirical analysis
in this report employs recent data to get consistent and updated results. This
strong focus is also necessitated by the resources available for the study.
                                           
1 This study has been commissioned by the Social Development Department of the World
Bank. The project was coordinated by Arve Ofstad and Alf Morten Jerve. Arve Ofstad has
also contributed to the report. The authors thank Arne Wiig, Steen Lau Jorgensen, Susan
Jacobs Matzen, Lynn Bennett and participants at a seminar at the World Bank, Washington
D.C., for their comments.
C M I
2
The report consists of six sections: The first section features a discussion of
how to understand social development, and a classification of the various
elements of social development that will be considered in the rest of the report.
The basic reasons for focussing on foreign direct investment, rather than
domestic or overall investment, are also given. The second section provides an
overview of theories about investment decisions of multinational companies,
as a background to our empirical reviews and analyses. The third section
reviews recent empirical studies that document how various elements of social
development have impacted on investment climate and actual investment. The
emphasis is on multi-country quantitative studies of stocks and flows of
foreign direct investment, that have analysed the effect of social development
variables. The fourth section presents the findings of a special econometric
analysis undertaken for the purpose of this report. This study uses data for 61
developing countries over the period 1989-2000 in order to supplement and
update existing studies, and to make a special contribution to the empirical
analysis of social development variables and investment. While the analysis
generated some very interesting results, the scope of this exercise was
nevertheless limited by availability of easily accessible and usable data. Section
five brings out some special features that affect the relationship between social
development and foreign direct investment in Africa, and section six sums up
the main conclusions and findings.
1 Social development – and foreign direct investment
The concept of social development has been used variably in the development
discourse to cover a wide range of issues. The UN Social Summit in
Copenhagen 1995 established “a new consensus to place people at the centre
of our concerns for sustainable development and pledged to eradicate poverty,
promote full and productive employment, and foster social integration to
achieve stable, safe and just societies for all”. The follow-up Special Session of
the UN General Assembly in 2000 reiterated these commitments, and added a
full paragraph of issues to be addressed under the concept of social
development (UN 2000). The UN Millennium Conference in 2000 adopted a
set of eight Millennium Development Goals that focussed on poverty
reduction, basic education, gender equality, reduced mortality and improved
health, environmental sustainability, and a global partnership for
development. The World Development Report 2000/1 identified
“opportunity”, “empowerment” and “security” as key instruments for the
eradication of poverty (World Bank 2001), and more recent papers from the
Social Development Department of the World Bank view social development
as a combination of “empowerment” (giving people voice and choice),
“inclusion” (making institutions and policies more inclusive of poor people’s
needs and aspiration and more effective in delivering them), and “security”
(enhancing social stability and human security).
Many of the above concepts and categories are vague or ambiguous, they
encompass a number of elements and are partly overlapping. For the purposes
of this report, it was necessary to employ more standard indicators and
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proxies, for which studies and data are available. We find it useful to
decompose social development into three categories; distributive outcomes,
rights and liberties, and security. Below, we discuss what each category
contains, and group elements of social development accordingly. In our
empirical study (section four), due to time and resource constraints, we had to
make do with easily accessible and immediately usable data.
Distributive outcomes address the degree to which economic and social
progress improves the lives of all members of a society. This includes income
distribution and reduction in absolute poverty, as well as access to public
services such as education and health care. Other imbalances are also
important, such as an unevenness of income or resources across regions,
across ethnic groups or between males and females. Inclusion is a key term;
does everyone participate in and enjoy the fruits of economic and social
progress, or are some socio-economic groups excluded. In our econometric
study we use illiteracy rates and a composite index of socio-economic
conditions as measures of distributive outcomes. We also consider corruption
relevant in this context, as it entails the potential discrimination of the less
resourceful, which is the opposite of inclusion.
Rights and liberties expand the opportunities for individuals and social entities
to pursue their objectives and goals. Human rights include a wide range of
political and civil rights, economic and social rights, and cultural rights.
Liberties and freedom are also broad concepts that cover civil liberties as well
as freedom from hunger and fear, and economic freedoms. Concepts of
“empowerment” and “participation” are crucial in this connection. Political
rights reflect the degree to which people can seek to influence decisions at
various levels in society, and include the right to vote in elections, and the
right to organise and to run for public office. Civil liberties are linked to
autonomy, and include the right to form and express opinions and
preferences, and to act on them without being unduly sanctioned. In section
four we make use of the standard indices of political rights and civil liberties.
We also use measures of democracy and democratic accountability as proxies
for rights and liberties.
Formal rights are important, but rights that are exercised even more so. The
degree to which a society actually empowers its members to participate in the
making of decisions, is thus a vital dimension to rights and liberties.
Empowerment might here refer to different groups, the poor, the landless,
workers, women, ethnic and religious minorities and so on. In our
econometric analysis, we use an index of religious tensions as a somewhat
imperfect proxy for the degree to which democratic rights can be asserted and
exercised. Other indices, such as the Gender Empowerment Index of UNDP’s
Human Development Reports, may be used to further expand this issue.
Security includes the enhancement of social stability and human security.
Social stability captures the degree to which people are able to plan ahead and
pursue their ends with a minimum of disruptions, whereas human security
addresses the integrity of their persons and property. Direct measures of the
degree of social stability include government stability, the quality and
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independence of the bureaucracy, the role of the military in politics, and the
incidence of internal and external conflicts and ethnic tensions.  More
indirectly, the World Bank (2002) perceives the situation of workers as a
determinant of social stability, focusing on such matters as labour standards,
job security and social security. As for human security, the incidence of crime
and conversely the rule of law can be considered key elements. We include
indicators for most of these elements in our empirical analysis.
Investment. In this report we restrict ourselves to studying the impact of social
development on foreign direct investment (FDI), i.e. private industrial
investment made by foreign enterprises, rather than total (domestic and
foreign) investment. There are several reasons for this choice. One reason is
that FDI is believed to contain a bundle of technical, managerial and
organisational know-how and to provide access to resources that would
otherwise be unavailable to developing countries, thereby potentially
contributing to economic development beyond the capital infusion it
represents. Though there is an ongoing debate on the actual effect of FDI on
developing economies, institutions such as the World Bank have come to
regard FDI a crucial engine for growth. Data on FDI is also easily available,
while estimates of domestic investment are less reliable and more difficult to
access. This implies that factors influencing domestic investment will not be
explicitly captured by our study, which is of particular importance for some
countries with high levels of internal savings and domestic investment, such as
India, China, and Botswana. FDI and domestic investment are presumably
positively related in many cases, as factors that make a country attractive for
foreign investors, also attract domestic investors.  However, domestic and
foreign investors do differ in certain characteristics, such as the range of their
investment options, and investment of the two types might therefore exhibit
important differences.
Global foreign direct investment has increased sharply in recent decades, both
in absolute terms and relative to world GDP, fixed capital formation and
exports. The greatest flow of foreign direct investment occurs between
developed economies. More than four fifths of global FDI outflows originate
in developed countries, and more than two thirds of global FDI inflows end up
in these countries. The share of developing countries in global inflows has
decreased over the last few years to 19 per cent in 2000. More than three
quarters of the inflows to developing countries end up in the ten largest
recipient countries, mainly in South-East Asia and Latin America. A mere 0.3
per cent of global inflows is received by the 49 least developed countries of the
world (UNCTAD, 2001).
Figure 1 illustrates the types of relationships analysed in this report. It displays
clearly how foreign direct investment per capita is higher in countries with less
political risk and more “freedom”. For the year 2000, data on FDI inflows for
some 120 developing and industrialised countries is used to rank countries
according to FDI per capita. The countries are then divided into ten equally
large groups, from the 10% of countries with the lowest FDI per capita to the
10% of countries with the highest FDI per capita. In the figure, FDI per capita
increases from left to right. The upper line captures the average political risk
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of each 10% group, as measured by the political risk index of the PRS group,
where a higher number signifies less risk (see below for more precise
definitions and sources). The line is largely upward sloping, which indicates
that less political risk brings more foreign investment. The lower line denotes
the average level of freedom of each 10% group, as measured by the average
of the political rights and civil liberties indices of Freedom House, where a
lower number implies more freedom. This line also for the most part slopes
upward, so freedom – as defined by Freedom House – is positively related to
investment.
Figure 1. The relation between some aggregate socio-political indices and FDI
per capita
FDI/capita, political risk and freedom, 2000
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The positive relation of socio-political issues to FDI seen in figure 1 is
suggestive, but hardly conclusive. The socio-political indices used are
aggregate, conflating a number of different variables, so the exact relationship
between social development and investment is not revealed by the figure. For a
deeper understanding of whether and how social development affects
investment, we must disentangle social development into its various
components. Below, theories of foreign direct investment are explored to
identify the potential impact of these components, and their significance for
actual investment flows is then tested using rigorous statistical techniques.
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2 Theories of foreign direct investment: Multinationals
invest to access markets and resources, and pay
little attention to social issues
Foreign direct investment decisions are made by multinational enterprises. To
explain why some locations attract more FDI than others, the key is to
understand how multinationals make their investment decisions. Theories of
foreign direct investment normally view multinationals as maximizing their
expected profits or their expected value, given the actions of their competitors
and the government policies of different countries. The main theories thus
focus on economic factors, and social development variables are at best of
derivative importance.
The “when, where and why” of foreign direct investment have been examined
in the much cited contributions of Dunning (1977, 1993). According to
Dunning’s OLI-model (ownership-location-internalisation), FDI occurs when
three conditions are met: First, a multinational enterprise must have some
ownership advantage through which it is competitive in the market where it
seeks to invest. This advantage might be in the form of a unique mode of
production or management, patented goods, or brand names/trademarks.
Second, there must be some location advantage to investing in one place rather
than another, for instance in the form of cheap inputs or a large domestic
market. Third, there must be some internalisation advantage which makes
owning a plant in another country better than licensing agreements with a
firm based there. This final advantage might be in the form of control over
technology or reduced transaction costs.
Dunning also suggests that a multinational enterprise has four possible
motives for establishing foreign operations. An enterprise might seek resources
abroad, in the form of low wage skilled labour, natural resources, technology
and so on. It might be drawn to locations where there is a large and growing
domestic or regional market for its products. Expansion could improve the
efficiency of its operations, through economies of scale or risk diversification.
Or, to get an edge on its competitors, an enterprise might seek to acquire
assets or positions of strategic importance.
Most of the determinants of FDI are unrelated to social development in this
framework. However, the idea that multinationals are attracted to locations
where labour is cheap, suggests that social development in terms of greater
equality and stricter labour standards is detrimental to FDI. On the other
hand, the productivity or skills of the workforce attract FDI, which suggests
that social development in the form of human capital accumulation has a
positive effect. The motives for investing abroad presumably vary between
industries. We might thus expect industries using unskilled labour, such as in
textiles, to build sweatshops where wages are low and regulations minor.
Industries requiring skilled workers, such as in electronics, would be drawn to
locations where the workforce is educated or well trained. For industries that
primarily invest to get access to natural or strategic resources, such as the oil
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industry, social development conditions might not matter one way or the
other.
The relation between the actual level of FDI and the flow of new FDI, and the
importance of expectations, is explored by macro theories of FDI. FDI flows
reflect the difference between the actual stock and the capital stock foreign
investors desire to have in a location, based on current conditions and
perceptions. The desired stock – and thus the flow of new FDI or
disinvestment – is determined by technology, human capital and general
aspects of the business environment such as political stability, liberalisation,
privatisation, taxes and corruption. Due to the sunk nature of investment,
there also is the possibility of hysteresis, where investment is sticky in the sense
that it does not react smoothly to changes in its determinants (Dixit, 1994).
One-off political events can influence investor expectations, according to
Stevens (2000): “Political changes are sometimes identified by forward-
looking agents as changes in policy regimes” (p.155). Signals of political
instability, such as devaluations, debt defaults, short-lived governments, thus
affect investor perceptions of the probability of future unstable conditions.
Political changes thus imply “a shift from one profit function to a completely
different one…”, “…implying alterations in the structure of the relevant
investment functions” (pp. 155, 158).  In other words, the relation between
foreign direct investment and its political determinants need not be a nice
linear one.
Economic geography theories of industrial location suggest that investors tend
to flock in certain locations. The presence of some enterprises in a location
makes it advantageous for others to locate there as well, for a variety of
reasons. One is the Silicon Valley effect, where the presence of highly skilled
workers draws companies needing their skills. Another is the presence of
suppliers, well-developed infrastructure and service industries which follows in
the wake of industrial location. Yet further reasons would be that investors see
the investment decisions of others as a signal of good operating conditions in a
location, that investors learn from each other how to operate in foreign
markets, or that companies match the location choices of their competitors for
strategic reasons. If any of these arguments apply, FDI inflows can be expected
to have a self-reinforcing effect. The gravitational pull of investment makes it
all the more important to implement policies attracting initial investment.
Multinationals care primarily about profit, and social development is
important only if it affects “the bottom line”. The above review of factors
affecting investment decisions indicate that social development issues are of
marginal interest. However, in recent years multinational companies have
been under increasing pressure from consumer groups, politicians and activists
internationally as well as from the UN and international bodies to act socially
responsibly. This may imply avoiding investment in countries that disregards
human rights, where conditions for workers or child labour are unacceptable,
or companies may feel obliged to improve education and health conditions
where they invest. Failing to act socially responsibly may negatively affect a
company’s reputation and sales, and thus its long-term profits. The
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importance of such a link presumably varies between industries. Companies
with a strong brand name that sell their products directly to end-consumers
are probably more vulnerable to consumer reactions than more anonymous
companies further up the supply chain.
3 The empirical evidence: Literacy and school
enrolment, labour costs, political stability and
corruption matter for FDI
A number of empirical studies of foreign direct investment have been
conducted, but unfortunately only a few of these include variables that pertain
to social development. In this section we review the findings from relevant
studies where the authors have found significant empirical evidence on how
social development factors influence FDI. In reviewing the literature, we
should recall that the causes of FDI differ across industries, between countries
at different stages of development, and over time as the industrial composition
of FDI changes. In order to be consistent, we focus on aggregate econometric
studies that use fairly recent data. i.e. data from or at least partly from the
1990s. Since our emphasis is on flows of FDI to developing countries, studies
of FDI flows between highly industrialized countries are not given much
attention.
The main results from the review are summarised in table 1. This table
contains a summary of standard variables found to influence FDI, and their
observed effects in a number of recent empirical studies. The studies show
broad agreement that FDI is attracted to countries with large domestic
markets, open trade regimes, and substantial past inflows of FDI. The impact
of growth rates, wages, human capital levels, taxes, infrastructure and
macroeconomic conditions is more of a mixed bag. These results by and large
reflect similar conclusions in previous reviews, such as Pearce et al (1992),
Singh and Jun (1995) and Chakrabarti (2001).
The studies referred to in table 1 are diverse in method and data, and the
conflicting results are therefore not surprising. Some do cross-country
regressions, such as Lipsey (1999) and Wei (2000), others use panel data
approaches, e.g. Cheng and Kwan (2000) and Noorbakhsh et al (2001). Most
study general inflows of FDI, whereas Lipsey and Urata and Kawai (2001)
study flows from the US and Japan, respectively. Urata and Kawai study flows
into a large number of diverse countries, while Lipsey and Noorbakhsh restrict
themselves to developing countries, and Cheng and Kwan (2000) and
Coughlin and Segev (2000) study FDI inflows into the provinces of China.
Finally, the dependent variable varies across studies, some divide FDI by
population size and others by GDP to adjust for country size, and some use
data on FDI stocks rather than FDI flows.
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Table 1: Determinants of FDI, recent results.
DETERMINANT  OBSERVED EFFECT  
 Positive Negative Insignificant*
Market size UNCTAD (1998) Asiedu (2002) Singh & Jun (1995)
Singh & Jun (1995)  
 Lipsey (1999)   
 Cheng & Kwan (2000)   
 Coughlin & Segev (2000)   
 Wei (2000)   
 Urata & Kawai (2001)   
Growth rate Noorbakhsh et al (2001)  Singh & Jun (1995)
UNCTAD (1998)
   Lipsey (1999)
Asiedu (2002)
Openness Singh & Jun (1995)   
 Noorbakhsh et al (2001)   
Asiedu (2002)
Lagged FDI Singh & Jun (1995)   
 Lipsey (1999)   
 Cheng & Kwan (2000)   
 Noorbakhsh et al (2001)   
 Urata & Kawai (2001)   
Infrastructure Cheng & Kwan (2000)  Cheng & Kwan (2000)
 Urata & Kawai (2001)  Coughlin & Segev (2000)
Asiedu (2002)
Macroeconomic
stability
Noorbakhsh et al (2001)
Urata & Kawai (2001)
Asiedu (2002)
Exchange rate  Singh & Jun (1995) Urata & Kawai (2001)
Distance from investing
country
 Lipsey (1999)  
  Wei (2000)  
Taxes  Wei (2000) Lipsey (1999)
Promotion policies Cheng & Kwan (2000)   
 Coughlin & Segev (2000)   
Business climate Singh & Jun (1995)   
 Urata & Kawai (2001)   
Social development
factors:
Cost of labour Wei (2000) Singh & Jun (1995) Noorbakhsh et al (2001)
  Coughlin & Segev (2000)  
  Cheng & Kwan (2000)  
  Urata & Kawai (2001)  
Human capital Coughlin & Segev (2000) Urata & Kawai (2001) Cheng & Kwan (2000)
 Noorbakhsh et al (2001)  Wei (2000)
* Significance at 5% level is required
Another reason for the conflicting results reported in the table, is that different
studies include different sets of explanatory variables in their analyses.
C M I
10
Arguably, variables that are robust to changes in the set of explanatory
variables are better substantiated as determinants of FDI. Chakrabarti (2001)
tests the robustness of eight different variables to changes in the total set of
variables. Of the eight, the only variable that passed his test of robustness was
market size. Of the remaining seven variables, he ranked openness as the most
likely to be correlated with FDI, followed by wages, net exports, GDP growth,
taxes, tariffs and exchange rates. Unfortunately, variables such as past FDI
and human capital are not tested for robustness in this contribution, nor are
variables related to social development.
Of the standard variables reported above, only two out of thirteen have a
relation to social development; human capital and labour costs. Human
capital is usually measured by school enrolment ratios or literacy ratios. Of
the studies containing this variable, Noorbakhsh et al (2001) is the one
focusing most explicitly on the impact of human capital on FDI. Using three
different proxies for human capital; secondary school enrolment, accumulated
years of secondary school in the working population and accumulated years of
secondary and tertiary school in the working population, they find all three
significantly positive determinants of FDI. Moreover, the size of the coefficient
implies that human capital is one of the most important determinants.
Noorbakhsh et al also prove that coefficients are larger and more significant
for later periods than for earlier ones, which implies that the importance of
human capital increases over time.
Wei (2000) uses literacy ratios and secondary school enrolment as proxies for
human capital, but finds none significant, though he does not attempt to
explain why this is so. Urata and Kawai (2001) actually find a significantly
negative impact of secondary school enrolment on FDI. However,
disaggregating the data into developed and developing countries, they find a
significantly positive relationship for FDI in developed countries and a
significantly negative one for developing countries. This, they argue, reflects
the fact that investors are seeking low-wage workers in developing countries,
and skilled workers in developed countries.
Coughlin and Segev (2000) use illiteracy rates as a proxy for human capital,
finding that FDI is significantly greater in Chinese provinces with higher
literacy. Cheng and Kwan (2000), on the other hand, use three different
proxies, percentage having primary, junior secondary and senior secondary
education, and find none of the three a significant determinant of FDI inflows
across Chinese provinces. However, they interpret the results as saying that
other factors have dwarfed human capital as a determinant of FDI, rather than
saying that human capital is unimportant.
The empirical evidence regarding human capital, school enrolment and
literacy is therefore indicative, but inconclusive. Even though one major study
(Noorbaksh et al) does conclude that secondary school enrolment and
accumulated years in secondary and tertiary education have a significant
positive impact on the level of FDI, others have concluded that schooling is
insignificant, and one study even finds a negative relation. One study confirms
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that increased levels of literacy have a positive impact on FDI, whereas
another study finds it insignificant.
The results on labour costs are conflicting. Most studies, such as Singh and
Jun (1995), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Coughlin and Segev (2000) and Urata
and Kawai (2001) find a significantly negative relation between wages and
foreign direct investment. Wei (2000), however, finds a significantly positive
relation and Noorbakhsh et al (2001) see no significant relation. These mixed
results mirror those of earlier contributions. An explanation of the variation in
results is that investors are interested in labour costs per produced unit, rather
than per worker. Thus if high wages reflect high skills, investors could be
drawn to high wage locations. Coughlin and Segev suggest that labour
productivity should be added to properly ascertain the effect of wages, and
doing so they find the expected negative relation between wages and FDI.
Note that Chakrabarti (2001) does not include productivity in his robustness
analysis, which raises the question of whether wages would be a more robust
determinant of FDI if adjusted for productivity.
Labour costs are more than wages, they also include costs and compensations
imposed by regulation or industrial relations. Cooke (1997, 2001) has studied
the impact of industrial relations factors on foreign direct investment in highly
industrialized countries. He finds FDI to be significantly negatively affected by
the degree of unionisation, restrictive layoff regulations and extension of wage
agreements to non-union members. On the other hand, he finds decentralised
wage bargaining and compulsory work councils to have a positive effect on
FDI. These studies might not be directly applicable to developing countries.
However, Singh and Jun (1995) find a significantly negative relation between
the number of workdays lost, as measured by the International Labour
Organization, and FDI for countries with low FDI inflows. This result partly
complements the findings of Cooke, by suggesting that countries with more
labour unrest are less attractive to international investors.
Going beyond the standard variables, the effect of political stability on FDI
has been studied from a variety of angles. In several surveys, investors name
this as an important decision factor. Singh and Jun (1995) find that the
political risk index of BERI, where higher numbers on the index signify less
risk, is positively related to FDI. The BERI index is a composite index
including many of the elements of social development discussed above, and the
result is therefore interesting. Wei (2000) finds a positive relationship between
political stability and FDI, but fails to report which index of political stability
is used. In the econometric studies performed by UNCTAD (1998), political
stability has no significant relation to FDI stocks and inflows.
Some studies use narrower indices of political stability. Asiedu (2002)
performs an econometric analysis of net FDI inflows to developing countries,
using two different measures of political instability; the number of
assassinations and revolutions over a 10-year period, and the risk of
expropriation. Neither of the two proves significant.
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Tuman and Emmert (1999) get somewhat different results for Japanese FDI
into twelve Latin American countries. They find that annual deaths caused by
revolutionary movements had a significantly negative impact on FDI.
Moreover, the Argentinean defeat in the Falklands war and the subsequent
regime shift had a negative impact on FDI inflows. However, two further
proxies for political instability, coups d’état and attacks against rebel forces in
neighbouring countries, proved of little explanatory power.
Stevens (2000) studies US plant and equipment spending in Mexico, Brazil and
Argentina over a number of years. For all three countries, various political
events had significant impacts on FDI flows. For Mexico, periods of
devaluations or restrictions on FDI were important, for Brazil, the 1980s debt
crisis and restrictions on FDI mattered, and for Argentina, the debt crisis,
restrictions on FDI and short-lived governments were significant. It may be
noted, however, that indices of domestic violence or military disturbances in
Argentina do not have a significant relation to FDI. And for none of the three
countries did the way in which a government came to power matter for FDI
inflows.
The majority of the above findings nevertheless conclude that some aspects of
political stability have a positive effect on the level of FDI, and no study claims
that political stability deters FDI.
Democratisation is related to political stability. Nevertheless, a direct link
between democracy and FDI has proved hard to substantiate. Noorbakhsh et
al (2001) include the democracy index of the Freedom House in their set of
explanatory variables, finding no significant relationship, or at best “an
inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and democracy” (p. 1599). Using
the components of the democracy index, the index of political rights and the
index of civil liberties, did not affect the result. Singh and Jun (1995) also find
no significant relationship between the Freedom House political rights index
and FDI. This conflicts with the trend observed in figure 1, but more
substantial evidence is needed to confirm that the trend is significant. We
return to this in our special empirical study (section 4). From previous studies,
it appears that political stability has more of an impact on FDI than
democracy and freedom.
Finally, corruption has a negative impact on foreign direct investment. Wei
(2000) uses three different corruption indices, compiled by Business
International, International Country Risk Group and Transparency
International, and finds all three to be significantly negatively related to FDI.
The sizes of the coefficients suggest, according to Wei, that “an increase in the
corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico would have the
same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by fifty percentage
points” (p. 1). Wei notes that his data does not allow him to distinguish
between different kinds of corruption, preventing him from analysing whether
the predictability of corruption, i.e. if you can expect to get what you pay for,
has an impact on FDI flows. The results of Campos et al (1999) on aggregate
investment, suggests that predictability is indeed important.
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Summarising the empirical evidence found in recent studies, it confirms that
social development issues play a relatively minor role in influencing levels of
FDI, as compared to the major determinants relating to market size, openness
of the economy, and level of previous FDI. Relatively few studies pay much
attention to social development factors, and most elements of social
development are not seen as significant. However, there are results suggesting
that improvements in human capital through literacy as well as secondary and
tertiary education have a positive impact on FDI. Most studies also show that
higher wages have a negative impact on FDI, and so does unionisation, but
these factors may be compensated by higher productivity. Finally the studies
find that in most cases investors are deterred by political instability and
corruption, while the extent of democratisation, political rights and civil
liberties have little or no impact.
The studies reviewed here do not, however, provide any direct evidence that
FDI flows are determined by the explanatory factors, or whether the causality
is the other way; that investment causes improvements in education or
political stability. Richards et al (2001) analyse whether a foreign economic
presence in terms of foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio investment,
foreign debt and aid have an impact on the human rights situation in
developing countries. They find FDI to be a significantly positive determinant
of political rights and civil liberties, but they also provide no evidence of the
causal direction. Further in-depth studies, for instance in the form of
individual country case studies, will be required to establish these causal
relationships with greater certainty.
4 An econometric analysis of social development and
FDI: Rights and liberties, internal conflict and
corruption matter for FDI inflows
To further analyse the impact of social development variables on FDI inflows,
we conducted an econometric study based on panel data from 61 developing
(low- and middle-income) countries over the period 1989-2000. The purpose
of this study is to update and complement existing studies reviewed above,
and contribute additional findings to the analysis. We collected data on FDI
flows for each of these years, and on 14 different indicators of social
development and three control variables. Due to time and resource
constraints, we were able to make use of only a set of easily accessible and
useable indicators. The analysis might have benefited from including a wider
set of relevant indicators, but this was unfortunately not possible. For the
indicators and control variables, we have no less than 5 observations for any
country, and the average number of observations is 10. Our country sample,
which does not include oil exporting countries, is listed in the appendix, as are
descriptive statistics for the main variables. As compared to time-series and
cross-sectional data sets, panel data sets provide a larger set of observations
thereby increasing the number of degrees of freedom as well as reducing
collinearity between the explanatory variables. Thus, the use of panel data sets
improves the efficiency of econometric estimates.
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We use gross FDI inflows per capita as the dependent variable, thus adjusting
for differences in country size. Based on the above review of previous
empirical work, we select two factors as control variables in our regressions;
market size as measured by GDP per capita, and openness as reflected by the
ratio of trade (exports + imports) to GDP. This is consistent with the
robustness tests of Chakrabarti (2001), where market size and openness prove
the most robust determinants of FDI. In initial regressions we also included
annual GDP growth, which on the whole proved insignificant, and was
therefore subsequently omitted. The reason for including control variables is
that these factors are clearly important for influencing the level of FDI, and
the purpose of our study is to identify social development factors that
influence FDI in addition to these standard variables.
We employ 14 different indicators as proxies for various aspects of social
development. Three of these fall into the category of distributive outcomes:
illiteracy, socio-economic conditions and corruption. For illiteracy, we use
data from the World Bank, which captures the percentage that is literate of
those aged 15 or more. For socio-economic conditions we use a composite
index from the Political Risk Services group / International Country Risk
Guide (PRS-ICRG), which captures a whole range of issues from infant
mortality and medical provision to housing, unemployment and interest rates.
We also include the corruption index of PRS-ICRG, which measures perceived
corruption in the political system. A high level of corruption is likely to reduce
opportunities for the poor and entrench inequalities.
Four indicators serve as proxies for rights and liberties. As others have done
before us, we use both the political rights and civil liberties indices of Freedom
House. The political rights index measures the degree to which citizens can
vote and run for office, and whether elected officials have a decisive say in
public policy. The civil liberties index assesses the extent to which citizens are
free to develop views, form organisations and assert their autonomy from state
intervention. The democratic accountability index of PRS-ICRG captures the
degree to which a country has free and fair elections, but also takes into
account whether elected governments are responsive to its electorate while in
office. Finally, we use the PRS-ICRG index on religious tensions, which
measures whether dominant religious groups seek to restrict civil liberties or
political rights, and whether secessionist religious groups are present in a
country.
The final seven indicators relate primarily to stability and security. These are
all obtained from the PRS-ICRG. The index of bureaucratic stability measures
the strength of the bureaucracy in absorbing external shocks, and its
independence from political pressure. The law and order index measures the
degree to which there is a strong and impartial legal system, and whether laws
are generally obeyed. The ethnic tensions index captures the degree of strife
that can be attributed to racial, national or linguistic divisions, while the
internal conflict index measures political violence. The index of external
conflict assesses the level of conflict with other countries, and captures aspects
ranging from trade restrictions and embargos to political disputes, armed
threats and war. Government stability measures the ability of governments to
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implement its policies, and its chance to remain in office. Finally, the military
in politics index captures the risk or reality of a military regime (PRS group,
1998).
Table 2 sums up the variables used in the analysis, their sources and
abbreviations. For the PRS-ICRG indices, a higher score implies better
conditions, whereas on the Freedom House indices, a lower score implies
better conditions.
Table 2. Variables, abbreviations and sources of data
VARIABLE ABBREVIATION SOURCE
Dependent variable
Foreign direct investment per capita (logged) lfdi UNCTAD
Independent variables
Control variables
Gross domestic product per capita (logged) lgdp World Bank
Trade (Imports + exports) as % of GDP Trade World Bank
Social development indicators
Distributive outcomes
Illiteracy ill World Bank
Socio-economic conditions SC PRS group ICRG
Corruption C PRS group ICRG
Rights and liberties
Political rights PR Freedom House
Civil liberties CL Freedom House
Democratic accountability DA PRS group ICRG
Religious tensions RP PRS group ICRG
Security
Bureaucracy quality BQ PRS group ICRG
Ethnic tensions ET PRS group ICRG
Law and order LO PRS group ICRG
Internal conflict IC PRS group ICRG
External conflict EC PRS group ICRG
Government stability GS PRS group ICRG
Military in politics MP PRS group ICRG
The method applied when conducting these regressions, consisted of first
running regressions where each social development indicator was added
individually to the control variables, and then regressions where several
indicators were added collectively to the control variables. Since indicators
belonging to the same social development category can be heavily correlated,
regressions never included more than one variable from each of the three
categories. Tables 3a and 3b present the results from those regressions where
all social development variables included prove significant:
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Table 3a. Regressions including political rights and civil liberties
Variable Baseline
Model
Model
PR1
Model
PR2
Model
PR3
Model
CL1
Model
CL2
Model
CL3
lgdp 1,29**
(0,084)
1,236**
(0,084)
1,204**
(0,087)
1,193**
(0,087)
1,225**
(0,083)
1,19**
(0,085)
1,182**
(0,086)
Trade 0,012**
(,002)
0,012**
(,002)
0,011**
(,002)
0,012**
(,002)
0,011**
(,002)
0,011**
(,002)
0,011**
(,002)
time 0,135**
(0,011)
0,131**
(0,011)
0,116**
(0,012)
0,117**
(0,012)
0,131**
(0,011)
0,116**
(0,012)
0,118**
(0,012)
PR -0,093**
(0,032)
-0,093**
(0,032)
-0,096**
(0,032)
CL -0,176**
(0,043)
-0,177**
(0,043)
-0,176**
(0,043)
ET 0,124**
(0,044)
0,124**
(0,044)
IC 0,06**
(0,021)
0,06**
(0,021)
C -0,144**
(0,053)
-0,125*
(0,052)
-0,14**
(0,052)
-0,12*
(0,051)
cons -8,193**
(0,586)
-7,457**
(0,626)
-7,176**
(0,627)
-7,193**
(0,62)
-7,02**
(0,634)
-6,737**
(0,635)
-6,78**
(0,63)
withinR2 0,4003 0,4057 0,4225 0,4192 0,4125 0,4297 0,4263
betweenR2 0,7984 0,8071 0,7942 0,8027 0,8114 0,7984 0,8055
overallR2 0,6773 0,6850 0,6805 0,6866 0,6910 0,6865 0,6911
No.
observations
625 623 623 623 623 623 623
No. countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
*) significant at 5% level, **) significant at 1% level
Table 3b. Regressions including democratic accountability and religious
tensions
Variable Model
DA1
Model
DA2
Model
DA3
Model
RP1
Model
RP2
Model
RP3
lgdp 1,23**
(0,088)
1,189**
(0,088)
1,196**
(0,088)
1,235**
(0,082)
1,196**
(0,084)
1,216**
(0,084)
Trade 0,012**
(0,002)
0,012**
(0,002)
0,011**
(0,002)
0,012**
(0,002)
0,013**
(0,002)
0,012**
(0,002)
time 0,124**
(0,012)
0,111**
(0,012)
0,108**
(0,012)
0,126**
(0,011)
0,113**
(0,012)
0,114**
(0,012)
DA 0,1*
(0,04)
0,104*
(0,042)
0,103*
(0,042)
RP 0,16**
(0,057)
0,159**
(0,058)
0,139*
(0,06)
ET 0,121**
(0,044)
0,118**
(0,044)
IC 0,061**
(0,021)
0,053*
(0,022)
C -0,128*
(0,052)
-0,149**
(0,053)
-0,116*
(0,51)
-0,128*
(0,052)
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Variable Model
DA1
Model
DA2
Model
DA3
Model
RP1
Model
RP2
Model
RP3
cons -8,058**
(0,592)
-7,811**
(0,574)
-7,76**
(0,585)
-8,553**
(0,572)
-8,319**
(0,564)
-8,265**
(0,575)
withinR2 0,4068 0,4197 0,4242 0,4006 0,4131 0,4153
betweenR2 0,7975 0,7946 0,7838 0,8215 0,8167 0,8076
overallR2 0,6780 0,6807 0,6731 0,6974 0,6982 0,6912
No.
observations
625 625 625 625 625 625
No. countries 61 61 61 61 61 61
*) significant at 5% level, **) significant at 1% level
Both control variables; market size and openness, have a significant positive
relationship to FDI across regressions featuring different social development
indices, and can thus be termed robust determinants of FDI, as shown in
tables 3a and 3b. (Variables that are significant and consistent in sign, no
matter which other variables are included, are robust determinants of FDI.)
This is fully in line with previous studies and confirms that countries with
larger markets and countries with open economic policies are more attractive
to FDI. A time trend variable, which was included for technical reasons,
proves similarly robust.
Our basic econometric model is similar to that of UNCTAD (1998) and
Lipsey (1999) in not including FDI in previous years as a control variable. If
lagged FDI is included, a number of instruments in the form of other lagged
variables must be included to get reliable estimates. This reduces the number
of observations, which makes it harder to get significant estimates for most
variables. With our limited set of data, this problem comes to the fore, and an
in-depth analysis of the self-reinforcing aspects of FDI thus produces few
tangible results. The impact of past FDI on current FDI has been satisfactorily
established by others, as seen in table 1.
We find that none of the indicators used to measure distributive outcomes are
robust determinants of FDI. Illiteracy and socio-economic conditions fail to be
significant at the 5% level, both individually and when combined with other
social development indices. In other words, our study indicates that improved
literacy or improved socio-economic conditions have no discernible impact on
FDI. The findings regarding literacy are in line with some previous studies.
More surprising, however, is the fact that we did not find any significant
correlation between socio-economic conditions and FDI levels. It might be
interesting, however, to study closer the impact of various components of this
composite index.
Corruption is not a significant factor when added individually to the control
variables, but is found to be significant in combination with certain other
social development variables. However, the sign of the corruption coefficient
is negative, which is puzzling. The corruption index attributes higher numbers
to less corrupt countries, and we would thus expect a positive relationship
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between the index and FDI. The result, however, is the opposite, which
implies that more corrupt countries get more foreign investment. This is
contrary to the results of Wei (2000), who uses the same index. One possible
explanation could be that countries that attract FDI have more predictable
corruption (see Campos et al, 1999). Another is that FDI is positively related
to corruption in certain industries, such as construction, and negative or
insignificant elsewhere. It is important to note, however, that the result is not
very robust.
We find that rights and liberties are very robust determinants of FDI. The
indicators on political rights and civil liberties are significant at the 1% level
both individually and in any combination with other variables. The sign of the
coefficients is negative as expected, implying that countries with a more
expansive set of political rights and civil liberties attract more FDI. The other
two indicators in this category, democratic accountability and religious
tensions, were both significant at no less than the 5% level, individually and
combined with other variables. The sign attributed to these variables is
positive, which implies that countries whose governments are responsive to the
population, and where there is little religious strife, attract more FDI. These
findings are very interesting, since previous studies have not arrived at these
clear conclusions.
Ethnic tensions and internal conflicts prove the most robust among the
variables relating to security. The ethnic tensions index is significant at the 1%
level when added individually to the control variables, and significant at least
at the 5% level in 15 of 19 regressions where it is combined with other
variables. Internal conflict was similarly found individually significant at the
1% level, and significant at least at the 5% level in 11 of 19 regressions
featuring other variables. Of the other security indices, law and order proved
individually insignificant, and significant at the 5% level only in two cases
where other variables were included. The other four variables, bureaucratic
quality, external conflict, government stability and military in politics, are
insignificant individually and in all combinations.
These findings show that FDI investors are concerned about and deterred by
ethnic tensions and internal conflicts in a country. However, they seem to pay
less attention to external conflict, the law and order situation, and military
dominance in politics. We also find that government stability does not
influence the level of FDI, which seems contrary to some previous findings
about the importance of political stability. Likewise, this analysis indicates
that bureaucratic quality does not matter, while we have previously seen that
the extent of corruption can be important for investors.
The robustness of political rights and civil liberties is noteworthy, since
previous studies using the same indices have found them insignificant, see
Singh and Jun (1995) and Noorbakhsh (2001). Most of the factors we have
found to matter for FDI inflows are in some way related to the degree to
which countries are internally volatile, in terms of suppression and conflict
between various groups. It might be that the factors we find significant have a
stronger association with investors’ sense of risk compared to other factors,
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and our findings can be summed up by the idea that political risk deters
foreign investment. In particular, rights, liberties and democratic
accountability might shape investors’ perception of the long term stability of a
society.
In terms of economic impact, our results show that improvements in the social
development variables we have found statistically significant, can have marked
effects on FDI inflows as compared to for instance increases in openness. A
comparison of coefficients reveals that raising a country one category on the
political risk and civil liberties indices, or on the indices of democratic
accountability and religious tensions (all of which have 6 categories), is
comparable to increasing openness by 8-16 percentage points. Similarly, one
category up on the ethnic tensions index is comparable to an increase in
openness of 10 percentage points, while one category up on the internal
conflict index is comparable to a 5 percentage point increase in openness, but
note that the latter index has 12 categories where the former has only 6. On
our corruption index (which has 6 categories), a one category improvement is
comparable to, roughly, a 10 percentage point increase in openness.
On the other hand, we find that illiteracy, socio-economic conditions, law and
order, bureaucracy quality, external conflict, government stability and military
in politics, are all insignificant for FDI inflows. The result on illiteracy is not
too surprising, given the mixed results on human capital measures that have
been found in other studies. The index of socio-economic conditions captures
a range of aspects, and each aspect is also weighted differently for different
countries, making cross-country comparisons difficult. Law and order and
bureaucracy quality we find to be largely insignificant, yet this result must be
qualified by the fact that both these indices are quite strongly correlated with
the control variable GDP. If these variables influence or are influenced by the
level of economic activity GDP, it is less likely that we find a significant
relation to FDI. The result that government stability is insignificant for FDI
clashes with the results of Tuman and Emmert (1999) and Stevens (2000) on
Latin American FDI, yet might reflect the fact that we use other indices and a
larger set of countries. The unimportance of external conflict and military in
politics, confirms the results of Stevens on Argentinean FDI, but goes against
the results of Tuman and Emmert.
Our results do of course depend on the econometric specification we have
chosen. Additional analyses show that had we used FDI/GDP as our
dependent variable, instead of FDI per capita, fewer of the social development
variables prove significant. That we get different results from such a re-
specification is to be expected, since the ranking of countries according to FDI
inflows is significantly different when GDP is used to control for country size
rather than population.
If more control variables were included, we would probably see a similar
effect, fewer variables would emerge as significant for FDI flows. However, to
fully address the issue of robustness requires analysis beyond the confines of
this study.
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The results we get also depend on our data, particularly the fact that we use
aggregate data on FDI flows. As noted earlier, this means that we are
conflating some important issues, in particular whether the investment
decisions of different industries are driven by different variables. Additional
analyses performed on a sample of oil exporting countries only, do indeed
suggest that investment in the oil industry is driven by considerations different
from those of other industries.
Finally, though our results indicate a relationship between some social
development variables and FDI, the results in and of themselves do not imply
that the causal direction is from the former to the latter. Additional tests
would have to be performed to determine causality. As econometric causality
tests leave something to be desired, a different methodological approach might
be needed to satisfactorily address this issue. Theoretical arguments and
anecdotal evidence suggest that the direction of causality is perhaps more
easily established for variables such as internal conflict, where investment
appears to follow as conflict subsides, than for variables such as political
rights and civil liberties. Further theoretical and empirical examination is
needed to conclude anything about causation for the latter variables.
5 The African experience: Being at the periphery of FDI
flows
The aggregate empirical studies obscure the fact that some countries or regions
do better than average in attracting FDI, and some do worse. As an example
of the latter, African economies have had comparatively little success in
attracting foreign direct investment. In recent years, Africa’s share of global
FDI inflows has declined to 0.7 per cent in 2000. The share flowing to Sub-
Saharan Africa representing approximately 10 per cent of world population, is
a mere 0.5 per cent, with South Africa and oil-exporters Angola and Nigeria
receiving more than half of this share. As illustrated by these numbers, most
African countries are at the periphery of global FDI flows.
A number of studies indicate that being a country located on the African
continent in itself deters foreign investment. Jaspersen et al (2000) and Asiedu
(2002) find that “being an African country” is a significantly negative
determinant of FDI. Based on her results, Asiedu suggests that “the average
FDI/GDP [ratio] for a country in Sub-Saharan Africa is about 1.3% less than
that of a comparable country outside the region” (p. 113). Being an African
country is thus bad for investment, which Asiedu attributes to a perception
among investors of Africa as inherently risky. This idea is supported by the
findings of Haque et al (2000), that commercial risk rating agencies rate
African countries as riskier than justified by their fundamental investment
conditions.
The bad reputation of African countries is only part of the explanation. If an
undeservedly bad name were the only aspect distinguishing African countries
from other developing countries, rational investors would perceive a chance of
greater rewards for less actual risk by investing in African economies, which
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would eventually correct the imbalance. To explain a persistent and deepening
African investment drought, we need a more permanent cause.
The self-reinforcing features of FDI flows, where large past inflows encourage
current inflows, are one such cause. A number of empirical studies confirm
that there is a link between FDI in one period and the next (see table 1), or
that countries that attract above average FDI inflows in one period continue to
do so in the next period (UNCTAD, 1998 and Lipsey, 1999). There is also
evidence that FDI in one location may spill over into neighbouring locations.
Coughlin and Segev (2000) find that the level of FDI in Chinese provinces is
significantly related to FDI in neighbouring provinces. In other words, FDI in
one location attracts more FDI to that location, but also to locations nearby.
Finally, physical distance from investor home countries deters FDI (see table
1). And some studies also find that cultural distance deters investment; Wei
(2000) sees significantly stronger flows between countries that share a
common language.
The implication of this is that a country with large past FDI inflows, that is a
neighbour to countries with large past FDI inflows, or that is close in physical
or cultural distance to the major investors, attracts more investment. The flip
side is that a country that does not have a history of FDI inflows, that has no
neighbours with such a history, and that is physically and culturally distant
from the major economies, is at a distinct disadvantage in attracting FDI. And
the disadvantage is further entrenched as more FDI flows to the more
attractive regions. By being at the periphery of global FDI flows, African
countries certainly seem to fit this pattern. This suggests that foreign investors
do not locate production in Africa because there is a weak history of industrial
location in Africa, as much as because Africa has a bad name among investors.
In discussing the means to make African economies more attractive for foreign
investors, some suggest that Africa is different, and that the measures taken to
attract FDI to other regions might therefore not work in Africa. Asiedu (2002)
finds that factors that have a significant influence on FDI in developing
countries as a whole, such as infrastructure and returns to capital, have no
significant impact on FDI in Africa. And factors that are significant both
across developing countries and for African countries, such as openness, have
less of an impact on FDI in Africa than in other regions. Based on these
findings, Asiedu suggests that “policies that have been successful in other
regions should not be blindly repeated in Africa, since these policies may have
a differential impact on Africa”.
On the issue of whether Africa is different, an important distinction must be
made between the effect of policies and their effectiveness. There is no basic
reason to believe that foreign investment in Africa is governed by entirely
different principles than investment elsewhere. The investors are the same
across regions, and can be expected to look for the same things when assessing
the profitability of investing in African economies as in other economies.
Policies would therefore not have an opposite effect in Africa as compared to
elsewhere. The fact that a variable such as infrastructure is insignificant for
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African countries, does not mean that improved infrastructure would hurt FDI
to Africa.
There is, however, reason to believe that the effectiveness of policies might be
different in African economies. Africa has a weak base of previous FDI
investment, which implies that African economies must be more attractive
than other economies to get as much FDI. African FDI inflows might therefore
react more weakly to improvements to the basic investment climate than
would FDI in other regions, but the direction of the impact would still be the
same as elsewhere. The results of Asiedu (2002) on openness, which state that
FDI in Africa is less responsive to changes in openness than FDI elsewhere,
underscore this point.
In assessing the impact of social and political development on foreign direct
investment in Africa, a striking pattern is revealed. In figure 2 we have ranked
some 120 countries, including oil exporters, individually from those receiving
the least FDI per capita in the year 2000 to those having the most, left to right
on the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis we measure the score of each
country on the composite political risk index of the PRS group, where a higher
number implies less political risk.
Figure 2. Political risk and foreign direct investment.
As the figure reveals, there is a definite upward-sloping trend, where countries
that are less risky attract more FDI per capita. However, the countries furthest
from the average trend are notable. Among the countries that have a low level
of political risk, but receive little FDI, we have quite a few African countries,
exemplified in the figure by Botswana. The countries that have a high level of
political risk, but that still attract heavy FDI inflows, are more often than not
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countries rich in oil or other natural resources, Angola being a conspicuous
case. If we substitute the political rights and civil liberties indices of Freedom
House for the political risk index in the above figure, we get a similar picture.
Our findings regarding a positive relationship between certain aspects of social
development and foreign direct investment are thus not immediately
confirmed for the African economies. However, we ran an additional
econometric analysis of 20 non oil exporting Sub Saharan African countries,
and found some of the same variables significant as in our general sample. In
particular, internal conflict and ethnic tensions emerge as significant deterrents
of FDI to African economies. Other social development variables, such as
rights and liberties, are insignificant, which might be due to the reduced
number of observations compared to the original sample. We thus do not
conclude that rights and liberties are unimportant, but the observed
importance of internal strife suggests that these variables have more of a
decisive impact on African FDI inflows.
6 Conclusions
This study has reviewed recent literature and presented the findings of an
econometric study of the relationship between components of social
development and foreign direct investment in developing countries. Foreign
direct investment is moved by economic considerations and is primarily
attracted by large markets, open economic regimes, access to natural resources
and other competitive advantages. FDI tends to flow to countries where there
is already a substantial volume of FDI, investors give priority to countries in
geographic vicinity, and show a preference for countries with cultural or
linguistic linkages to the home country. The findings of this study confirm the
theoretical presupposition that social development issues play a relatively
marginal role in influencing investment climates and investment decisions.
We found it useful to decompose social development into three categories;
distributive outcomes including ‘inclusion’; rights and liberties including
participation and ‘empowerment’; and security including social stability and
human security. Indicators of social development were grouped according to
these categories. We found that various indicators have different relationships
to FDI flows; some have a positive relation, others may have a negative
relation, and some elements were found to have no significant relation to the
level of FDI.
The most robust social development indicators with a positive relation to FDI,
are those pertaining to long term political stability and reduced internal
conflict and ethnic tensions. While previous studies have found no clear
relation between political rights, civil liberties and democratisation on the one
hand and FDI, our econometric study clearly shows a positive relationship.
Our results on conflicts also complement and expand on similar results from
previous studies, adding to our understanding of what kinds of conflicts
matter for foreign investors.
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Corruption, which may include grand corruption as well as petty corruption
affecting social development, has a negative effect on FDI according to
previous studies. Our study nevertheless produced the opposite effect; that
more FDI goes to countries with a higher level of corruption. This result
should however be interpreted with caution, as it is not very robust. In
addition, the result might be due to the fact that the corruption index used
does not capture the predictability of corruption, and to the fact that we have
used aggregate data as opposed to industry data when estimating the
relationship.
Where some previous studies see a positive effect on FDI of literacy and school
enrolment, our study finds no significant relationship between literacy and
investment. Most previous studies find a negative relationship between wage
levels and FDI, a determinant not tested in our empirical study. To the extent
that wage levels capture the standard of living of a population, it might be
partially similar to our index of socio-economic conditions, which we find to
be insignificant. Many other indicators of social development have no
discernible impact on the investment climate and levels of FDI, according to
available evidence.
Our survey of the literature on FDI reveals that there are few solid and
comprehensive studies in recent years that have analysed the issues in this
report. In addition, existing studies do not seem to have tested the effects of
health indicators, income distribution and equity considerations, or gender
relations. There is thus a need for further, more detailed, studies in order to
shed more light on possible links between social development variables and
FDI.
Future studies should also pursue the idea that companies in different sectors
have different motives for investment in developing countries. Companies in
more advanced industries such as electronics and ICT require better educated
employees and different environments, than companies investing in extractive
industries or footloose labour intensive industries. Another idea to pursue is
whether company attitudes are changing due to the increased emphasis on
corporate social responsibilities, and that they are becoming increasingly more
influenced by social development factors.
This study has nevertheless revealed that the relationship between foreign
direct investment and social development is complex, and sometimes weak or
contradictory. We do not offer a sweeping conclusion about the causality of
the social development – investment relationship. The standard development
argument that investment enables growth, which in turn enables social
improvement, might be a valid one. Nevertheless, most likely there are
mutually reinforcing forces at work, where economic development promotes
social development, which in turn lays the foundations for further investment
and economic expansion, through improved governance, participation and
stability.
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Appendix
The countries included in the sample satisfy three conditions. Firstly, they are
labeled developing countries in the Global Development Network Growth
Database2. Secondly, there has to be at least 5 observations of each variable of
interest for the period 1989-2000, and thirdly they should not be exporters of
oil. A total of 61 countries satisfy these conditions: Albania, Argentina,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chile,
Congo, DR, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Lebanon, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Table A1. A description of all variables included in the analysis
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Fdi 701 47.992 156.896 -206.536 3419.032
gdp 713 1689.096 1948.128 115.861 11421.78
lfdi 656 2.397 2.021 -4.722 8.137
lgdp 713 6.851 1.100 4.752 9.343
Trade 693 68.345 36.828 5.207 282.402
ill 682 29.195 22.796 0.3 89.1
SC 722 5.137 1.641 0 11
C 722 3.054 1.088 0 5
PR 720 3.704 1.847 1 7
CL 720 3.871 1.313 1 7
DA 722 3.360 1.323 0 6
RP 722 4.609 1.187 1 6
BQ 722 1.761 1.023 0 4
ET 722 3.834 1.452 0 6
LO 722 3.284 1.291 0 6
IC 722 8.223 2.766 0 12
EC 722 9.733 2.342 0 12
GS 722 6.814 2.399 1 11
MP 721 3.436 1.676 0 6
                                           
2 http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm. Developing countries are defined
as low-income and middle-income economies.
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Table A2. Pair-wise correlation between the variables
lfdi lgdp Trade ill SC C PR CL
lfdi 1.0000(656)
lgdp 0.7467
**
(650)
1.0000
(713)
Trade 0.3676
**
(627)
0.1756**
(688)
1.0000
(693)
ill -0.5763
**
(622)
-0.6974**
(673)
-0.2141**
(656)
1.0000
(682)
SC 0.3263
**
(656)
0.3602**
(713)
0.1143**
(693)
-0.1559**
(682)
1.0000
(722)
C 0.2827
**
(656)
0.3085**
(713)
0.1126**
(693)
-0.2539**
(682)
0.2259**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
PR -0.4472
**
(654)
-0.4417**
(711)
-0.0863*
(691)
0.3864**
(682)
-0.1652**
(720)
-0.3214**
(720)
1.0000
(720)
CL -0.5180
**
(654)
-0.4831**
(711)
-0.1730**
(691)
0.4103**
(682)
-0.2200**
(720)
-0.3053**
(720)
0.8534**
(720)
1.0000
(720)
DA 0.4292
**
(656)
0.4229**
(713)
0.1401**
(693)
-0.3675**
(682)
0.1299**
(722)
0.3941**
(722)
-0.6022**
(720)
-0.5304**
(720)
RP 0.3633
**
(656)
0.2327**
(713)
0.0872*
(693)
-0.3492**
(682)
0.1977**
(722)
0.2302**
(722)
-0.2233**
(720)
-0.2616**
(720)
BQ 0.3711
**
(656)
0.4828**
(713)
0.1935**
(693)
-0.2574**
(682)
0.3553**
(722)
0.4752**
(722)
-0.2766**
(720)
-0.2632**
(720)
ET 0.5133
**
(656)
0.4749**
(713)
0.0946*
(693)
-0.3338**
(682)
0.2098**
(722)
0.3227**
(722)
-0.3803**
(720)
-0.4452**
(720)
LO 0.4879
**
(656)
0.4352**
(713)
0.2512**
(693)
-0.3124**
(682)
0.2861**
(722)
0.4920**
(722)
-0.2562**
(720)
-0.2885**
(720)
IC 0.4679
**
(656)
0.4120**
(713)
0.2555**
(693)
-0.2839**
(682)
0.3105**
(722)
0.4017**
(722)
-0.3500**
(720)
-0.3670**
(720)
EC 0.3514
**
(656)
0.3116**
(713)
0.0872*
(693)
-0.2523**
(682)
0.1575**
(722)
0.2915**
(722)
-0.3772**
(720)
-0.3218**
(720)
GS 0.3733
**
(656)
0.2408**
(713)
0.1378**
(693)
-0.1637**
(682)
0.0734*
(722)
0.1484**
(722)
-0.1850**
(720)
-0.1994**
(720)
MP 0.4305
**
(655)
0.4660**
(712)
0.3870**
(692)
-0.4299**
(681)
0.2713**
(721)
0.4730**
(721)
-0.4393**
(719)
-0.4356**
(719)
DA RP BQ ET LO IC EC GS MP
DA 1.0000(722)
RP 0.1868
**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
BQ 0.4534
**
(722)
0.1098**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
ET 0.3221
**
(722)
0.3212**
(722)
0.1917**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
LO 0.4022
**
(722)
0.2681**
(722)
0.4941**
(722)
0.5670**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
IC 0.4188
**
(722)
0.3396**
(722)
0.4075**
(722)
0.6244**
(722)
0.7209**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
EC 0.3766
**
(722)
0.3620**
(722)
0.2415**
(722)
0.4367**
(722)
0.4427**
(722)
0.5676**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
GS 0.2854
**
(722)
0.1562**
(722)
0.2423**
(722)
0.3371**
(722)
0.4349**
(722)
0.4132**
(722)
0.2861**
(722)
1.0000
(722)
MP 0.5311
**
(721)
0.3284**
(721)
0.4966**
(721)
0.3830**
(721)
0.5140**
(721)
0.5965**
(721)
0.3940**
(721)
0.2015**
(721)
1.0000
(721)
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
The number of observations upon which the coefficient is estimated is in parenthesis.
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